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Advancements in information technologies promise to make our lives 
transparent.1  Corporations large and small engage in data mining activities 
that capture massive amounts of information.  Much of this mined 
information is about our daily activities—what was purchased, where, 
and for how much.  Our mailboxes and e-mail accounts are then stuffed 
with an endless stream of advertisements and solicitations.  Even more 
alarming are telemarketers who intrude upon our solitude at home.  
Financial information, phone numbers, and personal addresses of all 
sorts, whether accurate or not, are captured in databases and bought and 
sold to individuals, corporations, and government agencies.  Beyond data 
mining, video surveillance, facial recognition technology, and spyware, a 
host of other invasive tools are opening up private lives for public 
consumption.2 
Advocates of informational privacy are opposed to a system that 
promotes the free flow of personal information, driven more or less by 
economic considerations and national security interests.  Many privacy 
supporters have welcomed the European Union’s statutory regulations 
regarding personal data storage and transfer.  And while the United 
States protects informational privacy, it is arguably the case that these 
protections are fairly weak3—or at least not as strong as the European 
Privacy Directive.4 
In this paper I will offer several arguments in support of the view that 
individuals have moral claims to control personal information.  Coupled 
with rights to control access to one’s body, capacities, and powers, or 
physical privacy rights, we will have taken important steps toward a 
general right to privacy.  In Part I, a definition of privacy is offered 
 1. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998) (discussing how 
technology diminishes privacy). 
 2. According to one estimate there are more than four million surveillance 
cameras in Britain.  JEFFERY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD 36 (2004), citing Michael 
McCahill & Clive Norris, CCTV in London 20 (Urbaneye Working Paper No. 6, 2002), 
http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf. 
 3. See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE 
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 148–51 (1997); Randal Kemp & Adam D. Moore, Privacy, 25 
LIBR. HI TECH 58, 67–72 (2007). 
 4. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at http://ec.europa. 
eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf and http://ec.europoa.eu/ 
justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part2_en.pdf. 
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along with an account of the value of privacy.  Simply put, privacy—
defined as control over access to locations and information—is necessary 
for human well-being.  In Part II, an attempt to move beyond claims of 
value to claims of obligation is presented and defended.  Policies that 
sanction the capturing, storing, and trading of personal information 
about others is something we each have reasons to avoid.  In the final 
part, the tension between privacy and security is considered.  It is argued 
that privacy rights may be set aside only if specific procedural conditions 
are followed. 
I.  PRIVACY: ITS MEANING AND VALUE5 
A.  The Meaning of Privacy 
Privacy has been defined in many ways over the last century.6  Samuel 
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, following Judge Thomas Cooley, 
called privacy “the right to be let alone.”7  Roscoe Pound and Paul A. 
Freund have defined privacy in terms of an extension of one’s personality 
or personhood.8  Legal scholar William Prosser separated privacy cases 
into four related torts: intrusion, private facts, false light, and 
appropriation.9  These torts have been defined as follows: 
Intrusion: Intruding (physically or otherwise) upon the solitude of another in a 
highly offensive manner. . . .  Private facts: Publicizing highly offensive private 
information about someone which is not of legitimate concern to the public. . . . 
False light: Publicizing a highly offensive and false impression of another. . . .  
Appropriation: Using another’s name or likeness for some advantage without 
the other’s consent.10 
 5. Some of this part draws from Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and 
Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215–23 (2003). 
 6. See DECEW, supra note 3, chs. 1–4 (providing rigorous analysis of the major 
accounts of privacy that have been offered); Kemp & Moore, supra note 3, at 62–66.  
See generally Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) 
(attempting to delineate privacy’s bounds by discussing a “taxonomy” of activities that 
harm privacy). 
 7. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888); 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890). 
 8. See Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 
182, 182–84 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971); Roscoe Pound, 
Interests in Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 362–64 (1915). 
 9. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 10. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 155–56 
(1995). 




Alan Westin and others, including myself, have described privacy in 
terms of information control.11  Still others have insisted that privacy 
consists in the form of autonomy over personal matters.12  William Parent 
argued, “Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal 
knowledge about one possessed by others,”13 while Julie Inness defined 
privacy as “the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, 
which includes decisions about intimate access, intimate information, 
and intimate actions.”14  More recently, Judith Wagner DeCew has proposed 
the “realm of the private to be whatever is not, according to a reasonable 
person in normal circumstances, the legitimate concern of others.”15  This 
brief summary indicates the variety and breadth of the definitions that have 
been offered.16 
I favor what has been called a control-based definition of privacy.  
That is, privacy has to do with control over access to oneself and to 
information about oneself.17  One feature of such a conception is that it 
can incorporate much of the aforementioned definitions.  Controlling 
 11. ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL 181–
82 (2001); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, 
WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
115–16 (2003).  See generally Ruth Gavison, Information Control: Availability and 
Exclusion, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 113 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983) 
(discussing the distinction between public and private information, conflicts over 
information controls, and possible resolutions for information-control conflicts). 
 12. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of Persons, SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 2000, at 120, 123–24; Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, 
and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446 
(1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410–11 
(1974); Daniel R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
91, 91–92 (1989). 
 13. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269 
(1983). 
 14. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 140 (1992). 
 15. DECEW, supra note 3, at 62. 
 16. Samuel Rickless offers a barrier theory of privacy: “For X to have a right to 
privacy against Y is for X to have a claim against Y that Y not learn or experience some 
personal fact about X by breaching a barrier used by X to keep others from learning or 
experiencing some personal fact about X.”  Samuel C. Rickless, The Right to Privacy 
Unveiled, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 773, 787 (2007).  One problem with this account is that 
it is not at all clear what counts as breaching a barrier.  A bad disguise might be a barrier 
to those with poor eyesight while walls, fences, and security systems may not be a 
barrier to someone with Superman ears. 
 17. See also ALLEN, supra note 11, at 1–2; CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF 
VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 140–41 (1970); Gavison, supra 
note 11, at 113–20, 129–32; Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in NOMOS XIII: 
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 169, 170; Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 
RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 279–80 (1974); Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS 
XIII: PRIVACY, supra, at 149, 149; Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and 
Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 148, 148 (Richard Bronaugh ed., 1978). 
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access to ourselves affords individuals the space to develop as they see 
fit.  Such control yields room to grow personally while maintaining 
autonomy over the course and direction of one’s life.  Moreover, each of 
Prosser’s torts contains elements of access control.  Also, note that there 
is room for the distinction between physical privacy and informational 
privacy.  The former would afford individuals a right to control access to 
their bodies and places, while the latter yields a right to control access to 
personal information, no matter how it is instantiated. 
A serviceable notion of personal information comes from William 
Parent: “My suggestion is that it be understood to consist of facts about a 
person which . . . individuals in a given society at a given time do not want 
widely known about themselves.”18  More generally, personal information 
might be loosely defined as information or facts about specific individuals 
rather than inanimate objects, social institutions, and the like.19  For 
example, information about a specific individual’s sexual orientation, 
medical condition, height, weight, income, home address, phone number, 
occupation, and voting history would be considered personal information on 
this account.20 
In addition to the different conceptions already noted, there are two 
distinctions relating to the definition of privacy that have been widely 
discussed.  The first is the distinction between descriptive and normative 
conceptions of privacy.  A descriptive or non-normative account describes a 
state or condition where privacy obtains.  An example is Parent’s definition: 
“Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge 
about one possessed by others.”21  A normative account, on the other hand, 
makes references to moral obligations or claims.  For example, when 
DeCew talks about what is a “legitimate concern of others,” she includes 
ethical considerations.22 
 18. Parent, supra note 13, at 269–70 (citation omitted). 
 19. As with privacy, defining the term information is difficult.  See, e.g., Michael 
K. Buckland, Information as Thing, 42 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 351 (1991); C.E. Shannon, A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948); Andrzej 
Chmielecki, What is Information?, TWENTIETH WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, Aug. 
1998, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cogn/CognChmi.htm. 
 20. On this view, just because some bit of information is publicly available does 
not mean that it is not personal information. 
 21. Parent, supra note 13, at 269 (emphasis added). 
 22. DECEW, supra note 3, at 57–58.  Many counterexamples to control-based 
definitions of privacy illicitly move back and forth between non-normative and normative 
conceptions.  For example, Rickless, following Parent’s example, describes the Threatened 




Reductionist and nonreductionist accounts of privacy have also been 
offered.23  Reductivists argue that privacy is derived from other rights 
such as life, liberty, and property rights; there is no overarching concept 
of privacy but, rather, several distinct core notions that have been lumped 
together.  Viewing privacy in this fashion might mean jettisoning the idea 
altogether and focusing on more fundamental concepts.  For example, 
Frederick Davis has argued: 
If truly fundamental interests are accorded the protection they deserve, no need 
to champion a right to privacy arises.  Invasion of privacy is, in reality, a 
complex of more fundamental wrongs.  Similarly, the individual’s interest in 
privacy itself, however real, is derivative and a state better vouchsafed by 
protecting more immediate rights.24 
Unlike Davis, the nonreductionist views privacy as related to, but distinct 
from, other rights or concepts. 
These distinctions are not as important as some may have thought.  
First, it is possible and proper to define privacy along normative and 
descriptive dimensions.  Intellectual property is also defined descriptively and 
normatively.  We may, for example, define intellectual property without 
making any essential references to normative claims.  We can even give 
a description of the conditions that surround an intellectual property 
right.  Moreover, we can define intellectual property in normative terms by 
indicating the moral claims that surround persons and their property.  
The same is true of privacy. 
Second, without considering the justification of the rights involved, it 
is unclear if privacy is reducible to more basic rights or the other way 
around.  Parent and others have made this point.25  And even if the 
reductionist is correct, it does not follow that we should do away with 
the category of privacy rights.  The cluster of rights that comprise privacy 
may find their roots in property or liberty, yet still mark out a distinct 
kind.  Finally, if all rights are nothing more than complex sets of obligations, 
powers, duties, and immunities, it would not automatically follow that 
we should dispense with talk of rights and frame our moral discourse in 
these more basic terms. 
Loss Counterexample, which has no force if we are considering a right to control access.  
See Rickless, supra note 16, at 782–84. 
 23. For an analysis of the reductive versus nonreductive debate, see generally Amy 
Peikoff, No Corn on this Cobb: Why Reductionists Should Be All Ears for Pavesich, 42 
BRANDEIS L.J. 751 (2004).  See also Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 304–05 n.4 (1975).  For a critique of Thomson’s view of privacy, 
see Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (1975). 
 24. Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1, 
20 (1959). 
 25. See DECEW, supra note 3, at 29 (citing Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and 
Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26–44 (1976); Scanlon, supra note 23, at 315–22. 
MOORE POST-AUTHOR PAGES VERS.2 (SUPER FINAL).DOC 2/7/2008  2:54:33 PM 
[VOL. 44:  809, 2007] Toward Informational Privacy Rights 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 815 
 
B.  The Value of Privacy 
While privacy rights may entail obligations and claims against others, 
obligations and claims that are beyond the capacities of most nonhuman 
animals, a case can still be offered in support of the claim that separation 
is valuable for animals.  Even though privacy may be linked to free will, 
the need for separation provides an evolutionary first step.  Perhaps it is 
the capacity of freewill that changes mere separation into privacy.  Alan 
Westin notes in Privacy and Freedom: 
   One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek periods of 
individual seclusion or small-group intimacy.  This is usually described as the 
tendency toward territoriality, in which an organism lays private claim to an 
area of land, water, or air and defends it against intrusion by members of its 
own species.26 
More important are the ecological studies demonstrating that a lack of 
private space, due to overpopulation and the like, will threaten survival.  
In such conditions, animals may kill each other or engage in suicidal 
reductions of the population.  Lemmings may march into the sea or there 
may be what is called a “biochemical die-off.”  John J. Christian’s study 
of a herd of Sika deer illustrates the point: “Mortality evidently resulted 
from shock following severe metabolic disturbances, probably as a result 
of prolonged adrenocortical hyperactivity, judging from histological 
material.  There was no evidence of infection, starvation, or other obvious 
cause to explain the mass mortality.”27  In this case the inability to separate 
from other members of the same species apparently caused a die-off so 
that herd numbers could accommodate separation.28 
John Calhoun notes that experiments with rats and spacing in cages 
show that a certain level of separation is necessary for the species.29  The 
lack of separation leads to the disruption of social relationships and 
increases in disease, high blood pressure, and heart failure.  Calhoun allowed 
Norway rats, which were amply fed, to breed freely in a quarter-acre 
pen.  Their numbers stabilized at 150 and never exceeded 200.30  With a 
 26. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 8. 
 27. John J. Christian, Phenomena Associated with Population Density, 47 PROC.  
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 428, 444 (1961). 
 28. Id. at 443–46. 
 29. Edward T. Hall, Proxemics, 9 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 83, 87 (1968) (citing 
John B. Calhoun, The Study of Wild Animals Under Controlled Conditions, 51 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1113–15 (1950)). 
 30. Id. 




population of 150, fighting became so disruptive to normal maternal care 
that only a few of the young survived.  If placed in pens, the same area 
could support 5,000 rats.31  Moreover these results hold across a wide 
range of species, supporting the contention that separation, like food and 
water, is a necessity of life.32 
If it is plausible to maintain that humans evolved from nonhuman 
animals, then it is also plausible that humans may retain many of the 
same traits.  The question now becomes, is separation a necessity for 
well-being, and is it found in human cultures?  If so, like other basic 
requirements for living, we may plausibly conclude that privacy is 
valuable. 
Cultural universals have been found in every society that has been 
systematically studied.33  Based on the Human Relations Area Files at 
Yale University, Alan F. Westin argues that there are aspects of privacy 
found in every society—privacy is a cultural universal.34 
Barry Schwartz, in an important article dealing with the social 
psychology of privacy, provides interesting clues as to why privacy is 
universal.35  According to Schwartz, privacy is both group preservation 
 31. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 10; see also W.C. ALLEE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF 
ANIMALS 91 (1938) (finding that overcrowding reduces growth in animal species); 
ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 55–56 (1966) (discussing animal 
territoriality and its effect on reproductive success); John B. Calhoun, A Behavorial Sink, 
in ROOTS OF BEHAVIOR 295, 314–15 (Eugene L. Bliss ed., 1962) (discussing rat 
overcrowding experiment that led to atypical behavior and reproductive failure); John B. 
Calhoun, Population Density and Social Pathology, 206 SCI. AM. 139, 139 (1962) 
(same); EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 23 (Anchor Books 1982) (1966); H. 
ELLIOT HOWARD, TERRITORY IN BIRD LIFE 273–75 (reprint 1978) (1920) (describing 
territoriality among bird species). 
 32. See, e.g., ALLEE, supra note 31, at 91; V.C. WYNNE-EDWARDS, ANIMAL 
DISPERSION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 188–89 (1962); Edward S. Deevey, The 
Hare and the Haruspex: A Cautionary Tale, 49 YALE REV. 161, 178 (1959), reprinted in 
48 AM.  SCI. 415 (1960); E. Thomas Gilliard, On the Breeding Behavior of the Cock-of-
the-Rock (Aves, Rupicola rupicola), 124 BULL. AM. MUSEUM  NAT’L HIST. 31, 61–63 
(1963); Robert L. Snyder, Evolution and Integration of Mechanisms that Regulate 
Population Growth, 47 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 449, 454 (1961). 
 33. See George P. Murdock, Universals of Culture, in READINGS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 4 
(E. Adamson Hoebel et al. eds., 1955). 
 34. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 12–13.  John Roberts and Thomas Gregor support 
this view of privacy: 
[P]rivacy as a set of rules against intrusion and surveillance focused on the 
household occupied by a nuclear family is a conception which is not to be 
found universally in all societies.  Societies stemming from quite different 
cultural traditions such as the Mehinacu and the Zuni do not lack rules and 
barriers restricting the flow of information within the community, but the 
management and the functions of privacy may be quite different. 
John M. Roberts & Thomas Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, 
supra note 8, at 199, 225 (emphasis added). 
 35. Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 AM. J. SOC. 741, 741–
52 (1968). 
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and maintenance of status divisions, but it also allows for deviation while 
sustaining social establishments.36  As such, privacy may be woven into the 
fabric of human evolution. 
While privacy may be a cultural universal necessary for the proper 
functioning of human beings, its form—the actual rules of association 
and disengagement—is culturally dependent.37  The kinds of privacy rules 
found in different cultures will be dependent on a host of variables including 
climate, religion, technological advancement, and political arrangements.  
As with the necessities of food, shelter, and education, we should not 
jump to the conclusion that because the forms of privacy are culturally 
dependent, privacy is subjective “all the way down.”  The forms of privacy 
are culturally relational while the need is an objective necessity. 
In 1969, Edward Hall noted a link between a lack of privacy and 
psychological and physical disorders in humans and nonhuman animals. 
The disorders of Calhoun’s overcrowded rats bear a striking resemblance to . . . 
Americans who live in densely packed urban conditions. . . .  Chombart de 
Lauwe . . . has gathered data on French workers’ families and has demonstrated 
a statistical relationship between crowded living conditions and physical and 
social pathology.  In the United States a health survey of Manhattan showed that 
only 18% of a representative sample were free of emotional disorders while 
23% were seriously disturbed or incapacitated.38 
Lewis Mumford notes similarities between rat overcrowding and human 
overcrowding: 
No small part of this ugly urban barbarization has been due to sheer physical 
congestion: a diagnosis now partly confirmed by scientific experiments 
with rats—for when they are placed in equally congested quarters, they exhibit 
the same symptoms of stress, alienation, hostility, sexual perversion, parental 
incompetence, and rabid violence that we now find in Megapolis.39 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Herbert J. Spiro, Privacy in Comparative Perspective, in NOMOS XIII: 
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 121, 122–23. 
 38. Hall, supra note 29, at 87 (citation omitted). 
 39. Theodore D. Fuller et al., Chronic Stress and Psychological Well-Being: 
Evidence from Thailand on Household Crowding, 42 SOC. SCI. & MED. 265, 267 (1996) 
(citation omitted).  This view is echoed by Desmond Morris, who writes, “Each kind of 
animal has evolved to exist in a certain amount of living space.  In both the animal zoo 
and the human zoo [when] this space is severely curtailed . . . the consequences can be 
serious.”  DESMOND MORRIS, THE HUMAN ZOO 39 (1969). 




These results are supported by a number of more recent studies.40  
Overcrowding in prisons has been linked to violence,41 depression,42 
suicide,43 psychological disorders,44 and recidivism.45 
Given all of this, one can, with great confidence, claim that privacy is 
valuable for beings like us.  The ability to regulate access to our bodies, 
capacities, and powers, as well as sensitive personal information, is an 
essential part of human flourishing and well-being. 
II.  TOWARD INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS 
While it might be admitted that privacy, broadly defined as a right to 
control access to bodies and information, is morally valuable, it has not 
been established that individuals have moral claims to control personal 
information.  One way to begin is by asking how claims to control 
intangible objects, like facts about someone, are generated.  In the 
argument that follows, I will employ a version of John Locke’s proviso 
on acquisition: “For this labor being the unquestionable property of the 
laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at 
least where there is enough and as good left . . . for others.”46  Locke 
claims that so long as the proviso that enough and as good is satisfied, an 
acquisition does not prejudice anyone.  Viewed as a kind of “no harm, 
no foul” rule, actions that pass this standard leave little room for rational 
 40. See Andrew Baum & Stuart Koman, Differential Response to Anticipated 
Crowding: Psychological Effects of Social and Spatial Density, 34 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 535 (1976); David P. Farrington & Christopher P. Nuttall, Prison 
Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence, and Recidivism, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 221, 230 (1980); 
Fuller et al., supra note 39, at 277; Paul B. Paulus, Garvin McCain & Verne C. Cox, 
Death Rates, Psychiatric Commitments, Blood Pressure, and Perceived Crowding as a 
Function of Institutional Crowding, 3 ENVTL. PSYCHOL. & NONVERBAL BEHAV. 107, 114 
(1978); R. Barry Ruback & Timothy S. Carr, Crowding in a Woman’s Prison: Attitudinal and 
Behavioral Effects, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 57, 66 (1984); see also Jes Clauson-
Kaas et al., Urban Health: Human Settlement Indicators of Crowding, 18 THIRD WORLD 
PLAN. REV. 349, 353 (1996); Griscom Morgan, Mental and Social Health and Population 
Density, 20 J. HUM. REL. 196, 198 (1972).  But see John N. Edwards & Alan Booth, 
Crowding and Human Sexual Behavior, 55 SOC. FORCES 791, 805 (1977) (finding that 
human sexual behavior is not appreciably influenced by crowded conditions). 
 41. Edwin I. Megargee, The Association of Population Density, Reduced Space, 
and Uncomfortable Temperatures with Misconduct in a Prison Community, 5 AM. J. 
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 289, 294 (1977); Frank J. Porporino & Kimberly Dudley, An 
Analysis of the Effects of Overcrowding in Canadian Penitentiaries 8–16 (Solicitor Gen. 
of Can., User Rep. No. 1984-06, 1984). 
 42. See sources cited supra note 40. 
 43. GARVIN MCCAIN, VERNE C. COX & PAUL B. PAULUS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE 
EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR 113–15 (1980). 
 44. Paulus, McCain & Cox, supra note 40, at 112. 
 45. Farrington & Nuttall, supra note 40, at 229. 
 46. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas Peardon ed., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690) (emphasis added). 
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complaint—I will call this version of Locke’s proviso a “Pareto-based 
proviso.”47  Consider the following argument. 
P1. The value of privacy related to human well-being grounds a 
weak presumptive claim to use and control personal information. 
P2. Respect for persons, possessions, self-creation, and project  
 pursuit grounds a weak presumptive claim to use and control  
 personal information. 
P3. If no one is worsened by such use, then the weak presumptive  
 claims generated by the value of privacy and respect for persons 
are undefeated—actions that pass a Pareto-based proviso are 
permitted (no harm, no foul). 
P4. It is typically the case that others are not worsened by some  
 individual’s use and possession of their own personal  
 information. 
C5. Thus, the weak presumptive claims to use and control such  
 information are, in many cases, undefeated, and moral claims  
 (perhaps rights) emerge. 
The importance of privacy for human well-being, along with a concession 
that the promotion of certain fundamental values is a moral requirement, 
may provide adequate support for the first premise.  Only a pure deontologist 
would deny that good and bad consequences, especially those related to 
basic needs, do not generate weak presumptive claims. 
Support for the second premise builds on the notion of respect for 
persons as moral agents.  Without justification, it would be wrong to take 
personal information and leave the original possessor without it—as it 
would be to wrest an apple from someone who just plucked it from an 
unowned tree.  Developing one’s capacities and intellectual effort and 
engaging in lifelong project pursuit are generally voluntary activities that 
 47. The “Pareto” condition is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian 
economist and sociologist.  The Pareto condition is defined as: One state of the world, S1, 
is Pareto-superior to another, S2, if and only if no one is worse off in S1 than in S2, and at 
least one person is better off in S1 than in S2.  S1 is strongly Pareto-superior to S2 if 
everyone is better off in S1 than in S2, and weakly Pareto-superior if at least one person is 
better off and no one is worse off.  State S1 is Pareto-optimal if no state is Pareto-superior 
to S1: it is strongly Pareto-optimal if no state is weakly Pareto-superior to it, and weakly 
Pareto-optimal if no state is strongly Pareto-superior to it.  Throughout this paper I will 
use “Pareto” as a “super-weak” condition, namely to mean that no one is worsened.  See 
G.A. Cohen, The Pareto Argument for Inequality, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 160, 160–61 
n.4 (1995). 




can be unpleasant, exhilarating, and everything in between.  That we 
voluntarily do these things as sovereign moral agents may be enough to 
warrant presumptive noninterference claims against others.  In doing these 
things, we create the facts of our lives. Acknowledging weak presumptive 
claims to use and control personal information about these activities 
might be grounded in respect for persons and moral desert.  Given that 
the first two premises establish the same point—they are redundant—if 
either is correct, then the argument goes forward. 
A.  Bettering, Worsening, and the Baseline Problem 
Providing support for the third premise requires a clarification and 
defense of a Pareto-based proviso.  In terms of clarification, we must 
adopt an account of value so that moral bettering and worsening can be 
determined.  An individual could be worsened in terms of subjective 
preference, satisfaction, wealth, happiness, freedoms, opportunities, et 
cetera.  Which of these count in determining bettering and worsening?  
Second, once the terms of being worsened have been resolved, what two 
situations are we going to compare to determine if someone has been 
worsened?  Is the question one of how others are now, after my 
appropriation, compared to how they would have been were I absent, or 
if I had not appropriated, or some other state?  Here we are trying to 
answer the question: “Worsened relevant to what?”  This is known as the 
baseline problem. 
In principle, the model of informational privacy being sketched is 
consistent with a wide range of value theories.48  So long as the preferred 
value theory has the resources to determine bettering and worsening with 
reference to the use and control of personal information, then Pareto-
superior moves can be made and justified.49  For now, assume an Aristotelian 
eudaemonist account of value exhibited by the following theses is 
correct. 
 48. It has been argued that subjective preference satisfaction theories fail to give 
an adequate account of bettering and worsening.  See Donald C. Hubin & Mark B. 
Lambeth, Providing for Rights, 27 DIALOGUE 489, 492 (1988); Adam D. Moore, Values, 
Objectivity, and Relationalism, 38 J. VALUE INQUIRY 75, 76–80 (2004). 
 49. Someone could object and claim that being permitted to use and control personal 
information because one satisfies a nonworsening requirement is not a justification.  I 
may not morally worsen anyone by standing on my head at the bus stop—such actions 
are permitted but not justified.  First, little would be lost by just dropping talk of 
justification in favor of what is permitted.  Second, given that such actions, however 
silly, do not worsen and are within my rights, I would argue that they are justified—
morality requires nothing more of me.  See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 33 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1st ed. 
1949) (1785). 
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1. Human well-being or flourishing is the sole standard of intrinsic 
value. 
2. Human persons are rational project pursuers, and well-being or 
flourishing is attained through the setting, pursuing, and  completion 
of life goals and projects.50 
3. The control of physical and intangible objects is valuable.  At a 
specific time, each individual has a certain set of things she can 
freely use and other things she owns, but she also has certain 
opportunities to use and appropriate things.  This complex set 
of opportunities, along with what she can now freely use or has  
rights over, constitutes her position materially—this set 
constitutes her level of material well-being.51 
While it is certainly the case that there is more to bettering and 
worsening than an individual’s level of material well-being, including 
opportunity costs, I will not pursue this matter further at present.  Needless 
to say, a full-blown account of value will explicate all the ways in which 
individuals can be bettered and worsened with reference to acquisition.  
Moreover, as noted before, it is not crucial to the view being presented 
to defend some preferred theory of value against all comers.  Whatever 
value theory is ultimately correct, if it has the ability to determine 
bettering and worsening with reference to the use and control of personal 
information, then a nonworsening standard can be used to determine 
when weak presumptive claims to use and control are undefeated. 
Turning to the baseline problem (what two situations do we compare 
to determine moral bettering and worsening?), I believe that we should 
affirm the following base point.  We compare how someone is after an action 
to the moment before.  Consider a common case dealing with worsening: 
the face puncher case.  When Crusoe punches Friday in the face we say that 
Friday has been worsened compared to the moment before the punch.  
We do not compare Friday’s state of pain after the punching to his 
condition a month before when, let us suppose, he was in great pain due 
 50. For similar views see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I, X (Martin 
Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962) (350 B.C.E.); KANT, supra note 49, at 42–45; 
LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 26–27, 38 (1987); 
RALPH BARTON PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE 181–82, 201–02 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1950) (1926); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 408–09 (1971); HENRY SIDGWICK, 
THE METHODS OF ETHICS 46–49 (Hackett Publ’g Co. 1981) (1907). 
 51. The argument in support of the value of privacy offered earlier would support 
this view.  See supra notes 26–45 and accompanying text. 




to falling into a fire.  Since an individual’s level of material well-being changes 
over time, the baseline of comparison should also change. 
As with the baseline which compares how someone is after an action 
to a month ago, the following baseline is also questionable.  Suppose we 
compare how Friday is when he gets to use and control some value V to 
his condition where he does not get to use or control V.  On this account, 
whenever anyone exclusively uses and controls V, they worsen others.  
Assuming that water is valuable, Crusoe worsens Friday when Crusoe 
takes a drink.  Alas, Friday would be better if he got to drink the water in 
question even if they are both standing by an endless stream of perfectly 
good drinking water.  Such baselines are indefensible because they produce 
overbroad accounts of moral bettering and worsening.52 
A Pareto-based proviso indicates when others may have legitimate 
complaints against an established weak presumptive claim of use and 
possession.  If in possessing and using their own personal information 
no one is worsened relative to the appropriate base point, then no one 
could have a compelling claim that would override the weak presumptive 
claims already in place.  Put another way, an objection to appropriation, 
which is a unilateral changing of the moral landscape, would focus on 
the impact of the appropriation on others.  But if this unilateral changing 
of the moral landscape makes no one worse off, there is little room for 
rational criticism.53 
Several other points can be offered in support of a Pareto-based proviso 
as well.  A “no harm, no foul” principle leaves moral room for individuals 
to live their lives as they see fit.  While consequences matter, there is no 
maximization requirement—no required trade-offs of someone’s lifelong 
goals and projects for mere incremental increases in social utility.  In this 
way, a Pareto-based proviso accords with our considered convictions 
regarding respect for persons, and at the same time, accommodates 
consequentialist views linking theories of the good and theories of the 
right. 
The truth of the fourth premise seems fairly obvious in light of my 
characterization of a Pareto-based proviso.  When an individual uses and 
controls his own personal information, it will be the case that others are 
 52. For more about the difficulties in determining a baseline, see SHELLY KAGAN, 
THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 87–89 (1989); Hubin & Lambeth, supra note 48, at 492–93. 
 53. To adopt a less stringent principle would permit individuals, in bettering 
themselves, to worsen others.  Such provisos on acquisition are troubling because they 
may open the door to predatory activity.  To require individuals, in bettering themselves, 
to better others is to require them to give others free rides.  Both of these standards are 
open to rational complaint.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 185–86 
(1974) (discussing claims of justice in a hypothetical “Robinson Crusoe” case where ten 
stranded individuals have varying degrees of success fending for themselves). 
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not necessarily worsened.  Consider some health-related fact that Crusoe 
comes to know about himself.  To consider if Friday has been worsened, 
we compare how he is prior to Crusoe’s coming to know the fact in 
question to Friday’s situation after Crusoe’s discovery.  In either case, 
Friday is unaware and is not worsened by Crusoe’s use and control.  On 
the other hand, suppose that Crusoe knows that he is a violent sleepwalker 
and Friday is planning to sleep nearby.  In this case, it seems that Friday 
has been—or will be—worsened by Crusoe’s nondisclosure. 
If the argument so far has been compelling, then it will be conceded 
that individuals have moral claims to use and control their own personal 
information.  But since information is nonrivalrous, it is not clear that 
using and controlling personal information about others worsens them.  
To simplify matters, imagine a state of nature situation where Fred exists 
in isolation.  Over the years, Fred may acquire a host of information 
about himself—say, for example, that he likes spicy food.  In fact each of 
Fred’s actions, his life story so to speak, may be captured as information.  
Suppose that when Ginger comes along, she is not worsened by Fred’s 
possession and use of the aforementioned information.  Thus, Fred’s use 
and possession claims would be undefeated, and moral claims may emerge.  
Nevertheless, Fred’s claims to control such information do not exclude 
the possibility of others owning or using such information. 
In seeking to use and possess information about Fred, Ginger does not 
necessarily worsen Fred.  Suppose that upon seeing him, Ginger notes that 
Fred has green eyes.  Surely Ginger’s mere possession of such information 
does not worsen Fred relative to how he would be had Ginger never 
come along or had the acquisition not occurred.  But when Ginger offers 
information about Fred for public consumption—suppose that she shares 
this information with a much wider audience than Fred could have ever 
reached via daily public activity—she does worsen him in terms of 
increased risk, commercial exploitation, and the like. 
B.  The Risk Argument 
Central to the risk argument is the claim that in connected societies 
where information trading is both efficient and nearly costless, disclosure of 
personal information opens individuals up to certain risks, for example, 
being controlled by entities with their own agendas.54  Typically, such 
 54. Although not my direct concern here, I believe the risk argument could be 
modified to apply to small unconnected or nonwired communities as well. 




control comes in two flavors.  First, governments use such information 
to retain domination and expand power.55  Second, corporations may use 
personal information to overwhelm individuals in a sea of solicitations 
and promotional advertisements or to control their employees.  Sharing 
personal information about someone else with a third party—say a home 
address and religious affiliation—may have serious consequences.  German 
Jews in the 1940s, and more recently American Muslims, know this all too 
well. 
Two further examples should suffice in establishing the plausibility of 
this claim.  Keeping records of citizens has been, and continues to be, a 
way for governments to maintain control over their populations.  Nicholas 
Kristof writes: 
    As part of China’s complex system of social control and surveillance, the 
authorities keep a . . . file, on virtually everyone except peasants.  Indeed, most 
Chinese have two [files]: one at their workplace and another in their local police 
station. 
. . . . 
    A file is opened on each urban citizen when he or she enters elementary 
school, and it shadows the person throughout life, moving on to high school, college 
and employer.  Particularly for officials, students, professors and Communist 
Party members, [these files] contain political evaluations that affect career 
prospects and permission to leave the country.56 
A different case, but one that is equally alarming, is what happened in 
a small village in Greece.  In Orchemenos, Greece, there are many 
individuals who have a gene that causes sickle-shaped red blood cells.  
The problem is that when two parents both carry the gene, their 
offspring may develop sickle-cell anemia.  In an effort to prevent this 
disease, government researchers tested everyone in the village so that 
marriages between gene carriers could be avoided.  In the end, the carriers 
became a shunned subclass forced to marry among themselves, making 
 55. The following quote from a Chinese military newspaper applies a number of 
these issues to information war: 
   After the Gulf War, when everyone was looking forward to eternal peace, a 
new military revolution emerged.  This revolution is essentially a transformation 
from the mechanized warfare of the industrial age to the information warfare 
of the information age.  Information warfare is a war of decisions and control, 
a war of knowledge, and a war of intellect.  The aim of information warfare 
will be gradually changed from ‘preserving oneself and wiping out the enemy’ 
to ‘preserving oneself and controlling the opponent.’  Information warfare includes 
electronic warfare, tactical deception, strategic deterrence, propaganda warfare, 
psychological warfare, network warfare, and structural sabotage. 
John Carlin, A Farewell to Arms, WIRED, May 1997, at 51, 54 (quoting Jiefangjun Bao, 
Chinese Army newspaper). 
 56. Nicholas D. Kristof, Beijing Journal: Where Each Worker is Yoked to a 
Personal File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at A4; see also ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, 
WHO OWNS INFORMATION? 16 (1994). 
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the situation even worse than before.57  While the researcher’s goals were 
noble, they obviously failed to foresee the ramifications of disclosing 
this kind of personal information. 
In the typical case, without video, audio, and other kinds of robust 
surveillance, when Fred steps out on a public street he both creates certain 
facts about himself and relinquishes exclusive control of this information 
to those who share the public domain.  The information captured by others 
is held in nonpermanent mediums like memory and is acquired by a 
relatively small number of people.  In such cases, Fred incurs few risks, 
and the sharing of such information by second and third parties poses 
little threat.  Please note that Fred could disguise himself or go out at 
night to further limit public access to personal information.  Hinting at 
the property rights argument to come, Fred could use his property to 
justifiably limit access to personal information. 
But when such information is captured digitally via video and audio 
surveillance or with some other more permanent medium, Fred is subjected 
to increased risks.  Such information may go unused for decades and 
then be resurrected by those in power or with commercial agendas.  In 
societies where personal information trading or data mining is facilitated 
through the use of technology, like digital environments, the use and 
control of personal information opens individuals up to risks and losses.  
If so, the disclosure of such information will worsen Fred relative to 
the base point, and a step toward informational privacy will have been 
established. 
A serious objection to the risk argument is that maybe the risks 
imposed on individuals through the manipulation of personal information 
are counterbalanced by other values, such as increased opportunities or 
security.  Data mining companies that gather information about Ginger’s 
purchasing habits may be able to more narrowly pitch products and 
services.  If Ginger likes cowboy boots, data mining companies could 
provide her with information about the most up-to-date styles.  
Alternatively, Ginger’s government could provide enhanced security for 
her and others by using data mining techniques to search for criminal 
behavior. 
As an admittedly imperfect analogy, consider the risks foisted on 
someone else when they are included in a game of Russian roulette without 
consenting.  The typical game consists of a gun with six chambers, one 
 57. Charles Platt, Evolution Revolution, WIRED, Jan. 1997, at 158, 200. 




bullet, and somebody’s head.  After loading the bullet and spinning the 
chamber, the gun is pointed at someone and the trigger is pulled.  Surely 
the risks involved in such a game worsen the victim relative to the 
appropriate base point.  Nevertheless, one could argue that having 
digitally stored personal information available for others to exploit is 
not like playing a game where the gun has only six chambers—it is 
more like a game where the gun has a thousand chambers and some of 
the chambers yield benefits, not burdens.  True enough, but we are not 
playing a one-round game.  Imagine playing an iterated game with 
hundreds, if not thousands, of rounds played over a lifetime.  Moreover, 
as one plays the game, the risks of certain payoffs may increase with the 
changing times.  And in the typical case, the burdens and benefits will be 
imposed, not freely chosen. 
Two further considerations suggested by Helen Nissenbaum deserve 
mention at this point.  Nissenbaum notes that data shifting—using 
information gathered for one purpose in some new way—violates what 
she calls contextual integrity.  “In the public surveillance currently practiced, 
information is routinely shifted from one sphere to another, as when, for 
example, information about your supermarket purchases is sold to a list 
service for magazine subscriptions.”58  An admittedly extreme case of data 
shifting occurred when a stalker secured actress Rebecca Schaeffer’s 
home address from certain state licensing records and murdered her.59  
Moreover, the digitization of information coupled with the expansion of 
computer networks has allowed information aggregation of a sort not 
seen before.  Information that may be freely given in different contexts 
for various purposes is collected in digital profiles that are then sold.  
Data shifting and aggregation open up individuals to unforeseen and 
unconsented-to risks. 
These considerations provide a compelling answer to what might be 
called the consent argument against informational privacy.  On this 
view, individuals have no privacy rights because they have—by stepping 
into the public domain or by sharing information—agreed that others 
may own and control this information.  But even if consent, however 
thin it may be, is given for the initial disclosure of disparate bits of 
information, it does not follow that consent has also been given for data 
shifting and aggregation of this information.  The notion of consent implied 
in this argument against informational privacy may also be challenged.  
Appearing in public is a necessity for most of us. 
 58. Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 584, 585 (1998). 
 59. Paul Jacobs, Addresses at DMV Remain Accessible, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
1991, at A3. 
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This is not to say that privacy should never be overridden for the sake 
of increased security or market opportunities, but given the risks and 
benefits of such disclosure, the rule, both moral and legal, should be 
against allowing such activity. 
C.  The Bodily Access and Property Rights Argument 
Suppose that Fred creates and wears an antidisclosure suit that shields 
him in public spaces entirely.  All that his fellows know is that someone 
is present—they do not know if Fred is old or young, male or female, tall 
or short, et cetera.  In simply wearing his antidisclosure suit Fred does 
nothing wrong—he does not necessarily worsen anyone.  In this example, 
to discover information about Fred would require violating his property 
rights or liberty rights.  Alas, the suit and what it shields is his to control.  
While odd and probably perverse, if Fred were to reveal nothing about 
himself to anyone at any time, it would be perfectly appropriate.60  
Another way to put the point is that Fred’s rights to control access to his 
body, capacities, and powers—what might be called physical privacy 
rights—coupled with property rights will afford him near complete 
control over the information that he creates through daily activity. 
As noted earlier, the information that Fred chooses to reveal about 
himself may be owned by Ginger and others.  Part of reaching out and 
developing social relationships with others will be the voluntary disclosure 
of personal information.  But whatever kind of information we are 
considering, there is a gathering point that individuals have control over.  
For example, in purchasing a new car and filling out the car loan 
application, no one would deny we each have the right to demand that 
such information not be sold to other companies.  I would argue that this 
is true for any disclosed personal information, whether it be patient 
questionnaire information, video rental records, voting information, or 
credit applications.  In agreeing with this view, one first has to agree that 
individuals have the right to control their own personal information—
that is, binding agreements about controlling information presuppose 
that one of the parties has a moral claim to control this information.  
This is just another way of affirming the argument offered in support of 
individual claims to control personal information. 
 60. Assuming of course that Fred is not shielding immoral and criminal activity. 




Aside from controlling information gathering points, there is at least 
one other way in which individuals can protect themselves from invasions 
of privacy due to digital monitoring.61  J.P. Barlow of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation was the first to suggest this idea.  It may be possible 
to detach one’s physical self from one’s virtual self through the use of 
encryption—the online equivalent of an antimonitoring suit.  The idea is 
to encrypt all information that links data about you to your name, address, or 
social security number—leaving no unencrypted links between your physical 
self and your electronic identity.  Individuals would then just become a 
number identified with data in the form of e-mail letters, purchasing 
habits, voting records, credit reports, medical records, and the like.62 
To summarize the bodily control and property rights argument in 
support of informational privacy, we begin with four plausible propositions.  
First, individuals have use and possession claims concerning information 
about themselves.  Second, individuals have access control rights over 
their bodies, capacities, and powers.  Third, individuals may acquire 
physical and intellectual property that will aid in restricting access to 
personal information.  And finally, individuals have a general moral and 
legal right to make contracts.  Taken together, these rights, claims, and 
liberties provide the foundation for informational privacy. 
One problem for this second argument in support of informational 
privacy is that given disparities in holdings and the subsequent ability to 
fence oneself off from the outside world, some individuals will have more 
privacy than others.  The rich will be able to hide behind walls, fences, 
lawyers, and butlers, while the not so fortunate will be left exposed to 
public consumption.  Consider the following case. 
[O]n the night of October 30, 1979 . . . an NBC television camera crew entered 
the apartment of Dave and Brownie Miller in Los Angeles, without their 
consent, to film the activities of Los Angeles Fire Department paramedics called 
to the Miller home to administer life-saving techniques to Dave Miller, who had 
suffered a heart attack in his bedroom.  The NBC television camera crew not 
only filmed the paramedics’ attempts to assist Miller, but NBC used the film on 
its nightly news without obtaining anyone’s consent.  In addition, after it had 
received complaints from both Brownie Miller and her daughter, Marlene 
Miller Belloni, NBC later used portions of the film in a commercial advertising 
an NBC “mini-documentary” about the paramedics’ work.63 
 61. For numerous other ways to maximize one’s control over personal information, see 
DEBORAH G. JOHNSON, COMPUTERS ETHICS 134–35 (3d ed. 2001) (quoting Gary T. Marx, 
Privacy & Technology, WHOLE EARTH REV., Winter 1991, at 90, 94). 
 62. For more about how technology can protect privacy and security, see Ann 
Cavoukian, Security Technologies Enabling Privacy (STEPs): Time for a Paradigm Shift 
(Off. Info. & Privacy Commissioner Ont., Toronto, Ont.), June 1, 2002, at 7–9, available 
at http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/steps.pdf. 
 63. Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
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One would suspect that if the Millers had employed guards, security 
fences, and perhaps “high priced” lawyers, they would have successfully 
protected their privacy. 
While true, I believe that this sort of objection is fairly anemic.  
Individuals will still be able to keep sensitive personal information secret by 
manipulating what property they do hold.  It is not as if wearing disguises or 
paying cash will cease to work.  Individuals with little in terms of property 
holdings will still be able to restrict information leakage through second 
and third parties via contracts and agreements.  And finally, if moral 
norms are to be reflected in the law, legal privacy guarantees codified in 
state and federal statutes will cover everyone. 
III.  APPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Having said all of this, I would like to test the model of informational 
privacy that has been offered by examining two cases dealing with personal 
information control.  A canonical example of a privacy violation is all too 
familiar in garden-variety peeping Tom cases.  A second case, one that 
will be examined in some detail, concerns privacy and governmental 
surveillance. 
A.  Peeping Toms and Informational Privacy 
Suppose Tom, after sneaking through the bushes and pulling aside a 
blind, licentiously watches Ginger who is in her house.  Maybe Tom 
watches Ginger take a shower or dress for bed.  We can all agree that 
what Tom is doing is immoral—and illegal—given that Ginger does not 
know and has not consented to being watched.  But why?  The typical 
answer is that Tom violated Ginger’s right to privacy. 
In a two-person world, it might be difficult to see how Ginger is 
worsened by Tom’s peeping.  Putting aside property rights violations—
Tom is standing on Ginger’s land and has interfered with Ginger’s 
control of the window blind—it would seem that Ginger is not worsened 
in any objective sense.  Tom’s actions do not open Ginger up to third 
party risks of control or manipulation, because there are no third parties.  
Moreover, suppose that he is not recording the encounter.  Any information 
obtained will fade with his memory. 
It does no good to say that Tom’s peeping worsens Ginger because she 
has a general wish or desire not to be watched.  Mere desires and wishes are 
not the foundations of value claims; however, they may reflect such 




claims.64  In such a contrived two-person world, we may have to say that 
Tom does nothing wrong in watching Ginger.  In the real world, however, 
Tom’s acquisition of information about Ginger does create risks that are 
morally relevant to Ginger’s well-being.  Maybe Tom innocently 
mentions Ginger’s open window to James the burglar.  Moreover, Ginger’s 
knowledge of Tom’s act is irrelevant to questions of bettering and 
worsening.  She might never know of the risks foisted on her by Tom, 
yet still be worsened. 
As we move upward from the two-person case to institutions, legal 
systems, and cultural norms that affect relations across numerous 
individuals, and if we keep in mind that privacy is a basic need, then we 
will have provided adequate grounds for forbidding Tom’s behavior.  
His act by itself may not worsen, but allowing such a practice would. 
B.  Privacy, Secrecy, and Government Surveillance 
In times of national crisis, citizens are often asked to trade liberty and 
privacy for security.  And why not, it is argued, if we can obtain a fair 
amount of security for just a little privacy?  Moreover, the surveillance 
that enhances security need not be overly intrusive or life-altering.  It is 
not as if government agents need to physically search each and every 
suspect or those linked to a suspect.  Advancements in digital technology 
have made such surveillance relatively unobtrusive.  Video monitoring, global 
positioning systems, biometric technologies, along with data surveillance 
may provide law enforcement officials monitoring tools without also 
unduly burdening those being watched. 
Against this view are those who maintain that we should be worried 
about trading privacy for security.  Criminals and terrorists, it is argued, 
are nowhere near as dangerous as governments.  There are far too many 
examples for us to deny Lord Acton’s dictum, “Power tends to corrupt, 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”65  If information control yields 
power, and total information awareness radically expands that power, 
then we have good reason to pause before trading privacy for security. 
If the model of informational privacy that has been presented is 
correct, then individuals have moral claims to control personal information.  
Due to space considerations, I will not provide arguments justifying 
physical privacy claims66 or security rights—please assume that individuals 
 64. For a defense of “objectivity” in relation to value claims and an attack on 
“subjective” accounts of moral value, see Moore, supra note 48, at 80–82. 
 65. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 3, 1887), in 1 LIFE 
AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 372 (1904). 
 66. This argument runs parallel to the argument for information privacy already 
considered.  The primary difference is that use of one’s body, capacities, and powers is 
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have rights to control access to their bodies and specific locations, and 
that individuals have security rights (perhaps this right is simply a 
combination of individual rights to life, property, and self-defense).67  
Given that security interests and privacy claims often conflict, what is 
needed is a generally agreed upon process for determining an appropriate 
balance.  In this final part, I will consider the often-used “balancing test” 
view.  Several cases will be presented which indicate how easily balancing 
arguments go awry.  We should not blithely trust government officials 
with good intentions.  I will argue that one way to appropriately balance 
privacy and security is (1) to insist upon establishing probable cause for 
an intrusion, (2) allow for robust judicial discretion on issuing warrants, 
and (3) ensure public oversight of the process and the reasoning involved. 
rivalrous—unlike the use of information about others.  Using or attempting to use 
someone else’s body will, in the vast majority of cases, worsen them relative to the 
appropriate base point. 
 67. At first glance, security is valuable and can be separated into three distinct yet 
interconnected domains.  At the most basic level, security affords individuals control 
over their lives, projects, and property.  To be secure at this level is to have sovereignty 
over a private domain—it is to be free from unjustified interference from other individuals, 
corporations, and governments.  At this level, privacy and security come bundled together. 
At the second level, security protects groups, businesses, and corporations from 
unjustified interference with projects and property.  Corporations need to be secure from 
industrial espionage, theft, and the like.  Without this kind of control, businesses and 
corporations could not operate in a free market—not for long anyway.  In any case, if we 
ask the question, “Why do we care about corporations and free markets?,” we are 
quickly led back to security at the individual level.  We value security at the level of 
groups, businesses, and corporations because these entities are intertwined with security 
at the personal level.  It is through these groups that many of us pursue lifelong plans and 
projects and order our lives as we see fit.  Few would maintain that these groups are 
valuable independent of their impact on individual lives.  Privacy and security come 
bundled together at this level as well, although in a different way.  Through the use of 
walls, guards, and fences, groups are able to secure a private domain that may be 
necessary for the continued existence of groups and group activities. 
There is also national security to consider.  Here we are worried about the continued 
existence of a political union.  Our institutions and markets need to be protected from 
foreign invasion, plagues, and terrorism.  But again it seems that we value national 
security, not because some specific political union is valuable in itself, but because it is a 
necessary part of protecting individual liberty.  Armed services, intelligence agencies, 
police departments, public health institutions, and legal systems provide security for 
groups, businesses, and at the most fundamental level, individuals. 




C.  A Brief Overview of Surveillance Law in the United States 
Within the United States legal system, there are four ways that law 
enforcement agents can engage in surveillance.68  First, there are warrants 
authorizing the interception of communications.  Second, there are warrants 
authorizing the search of physical premises.  For example, Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act requires that law enforcement 
officials obtain a warrant from a judge to conduct surveillance in criminal 
cases.69  To issue the warrant, the judge must find probable cause to believe 
that the suspect “is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a 
particular offense.”70  Third, there are provisions that allow trap-and-trace 
devices and pen traps. For example, trap-and-trace devices allow law 
enforcement agents to trace outgoing and incoming telephone numbers.  
Finally, there are subpoenas requiring the production of goods such as 
telephone logs or e-mail records.  Unlike the first two methods of 
surveillance, the last two require a lower standard of justification.  
Trap-and-trace devices only require a sworn declaration that the 
information being sought is relevant to an investigation.71  Court orders 
for records require that agents show that the information being sought is 
relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.72  Moreover, each of 
these requirements applies only to domestic surveillance—monitoring 
individuals who are not American citizens is another matter. 
Surveillance of American citizens is carried out by several agencies 
including city, county, and state police departments and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI).  The National Security Administration (NSA) and 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are forbidden by law from monitoring 
domestic activities and are responsible for conducting surveillance outside 
the United States.73 
To clarify the intelligence gathering abilities of the FBI, CIA, and 
NSA, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 (FISA).74  
Judicial oversight of FISA warrants was given to a newly created court 
 68. Jacob R. Lilly, National Security at What Price?: A Look into Liberty Concerns in 
the Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and a Proposed Constitutional 
Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 457 (2003). 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2000); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 218. 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000). 
 72. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(C) (2000). 
 73. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000). 
 74. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. 
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called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).75  To obtain a 
FISC order allowing surveillance of a U.S. citizen, the government must 
show that the target is a foreign power or is the agent of a foreign power.76  
Since the information is not related to a criminal investigation, there is 
no requirement of probable cause—that is, government agents do not need 
to show that the target is, has, or will commit a crime.  If the target is not 
a U.S. citizen, then no court order is necessary and only authorization 
from the Attorney General is required.77 
The USA PATRIOT Act made numerous changes to the surveillance 
methods already mentioned.  Below is a list of some of the changes.  The 
PATRIOT Act: 
1. Expands the government’s ability to conduct covert “sneak and 
peak” searches.  Government agents may take photographs, seize  
 property, and not notify the target until a later time.78 
2. Allows the inclusion of DNA information into databases of 
 individuals convicted of “any crime of violence.”79 
3. Increases government surveillance abilities of suspected computer 
trespassers—any target suspected of violating the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act may be monitored without a  court 
order.80 
4. Increases the government’s ability to access records held by 
third parties.81  By expanding the use of FISA, targets “whose 
records  are sought need not be an agent of a foreign power.  
United States citizens could be . . . investigated on account of 
activities connecting them to an investigation of international 
 75. FISA essentially allows electronic surveillance and physical searches of 
foreigners and U.S. citizens when there is “probable cause to believe that . . . 
the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”  Still, 
standards for obtaining a warrant are much less rigorous than under Title III . . . . 
Laurie Thomas Lee, The USA PATRIOT Act and Telecommunications: Privacy Under 
Attack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 374–75 (2003) (citing 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1804(a), 1805(a)(3)(A), 1823(a), 1824(a)(3)(A) (2000)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2000). 
 78. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 285–86 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. 
 79. Id. § 503, 115 Stat. at 364. 
 80. Id. § 217, 115 Stat. at 290–91. 
 81. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287. 




terrorism.”82  In addition, FISC judges must issue a warrant if 
the application  meets the requirements of Section 215. 
Beyond the government surveillance powers already noted, the U.S. 
Constitution grants the President broad powers in times of crisis and 
war—in early 2002 President George W. Bush implemented a secret 
program that allowed the NSA to conduct warrantless searches of U.S. 
citizens.  This program authorized the NSA to search international phone 
calls from U.S. citizens, thus sidestepping FISA.83 
D.  “Just Trust Us”—Trading Civil Rights for Security 
A common view is that we should give the benefit of the doubt to 
those in power and assume that officials will not violate individual rights 
without just cause.  Public officials typically seek office to promote the 
public good and are generally well meaning and sincere people—we 
should trust them to do what is right and fair. 
Arguably, there are good reasons to distrust this method of establishing 
an appropriate balance between privacy and security.  Justice Brandeis, 
dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, wrote: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert 
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.84 
Noting a few examples should suffice in demonstrating the perils of 
letting those in power set the guidelines for surveillance: Abraham 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the border states;85 
Japanese-American internment during World War II;86 McCarthy and 
the House Un-American Activities Committee;87 Laird v. Tatum,88 allowing 
 82. Lee, supra note 75, at 379. 
 83. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 84. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 85. Lilly, supra note 68, at 450–51.  Lilly notes that these civil rights violations 
were not the first in American history.  “The Alien and Sedition Acts, Andrew Jackson’s 
unlawful detention of reporter Louis Louailler, and military actions during ‘Dorr’s 
Rebellion’ in 1842 all violated personal civil liberties in the name of national security.”  
Id. at 450 n.14.  “Habeas corpus” is Latin for “that you have the body.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).  See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 86. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16, 223–24 (1944); Yasui 
v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116–17 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. 
Supp. 1445, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 828 F.2d 591, 
592–93 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 
1984). 
 87. Lilly, supra note 68, at 453–54. 
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military surveillance of civilian activity;89 and COINTELPRO, the FBI’s 
covert action program against American citizens.90  One of the more 
humorous examples comes from P.J. O’Rourke. 
The [United States Department of Agriculture] has over 106,000 employees . . . 
[and] they’re too busy doing things like administering the Federal Wool and 
Mohair Program.  According to the U.S General Accounting Office report to 
Congress on the 1990 farm bill, “The government established a wool and mohair 
price-support program in 1954 . . . to encourage domestic wool production in the 
interest of national security.”  Really, it says that. . . .  From 1955 to 1980, $1.1 
billion was spent on wool and mohair price supports, with 80 percent of that 
money going to a mere six thousand shepherds and (I guess) moherds.  This is 
$146,400 per Bo Peep.91 
A more current example comes from abuses related to the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.92  Here I am thinking of Al-
Hussayen’s detainment for more than a year for “providing expert advice and 
assistance” to terrorist organizations.93  Finally, in March 2007, numerous 
 88. 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to 
challenge the Army’s surveillance of civilian political activity). 
 89. See Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington National Office, ACLU 
Looks at Domestic Surveillance and the Need to Watch the Watchers in Times of Crisis 
(Oct. 10, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/FreeSpeech/FreeSpeech.cfm?ID=9790&c=86. 
 90. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 3–4 (1976). 
 91. P.J. O’ROURKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES: A LONE HUMORIST ATTEMPTS TO 
EXPLAIN THE ENTIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT 144–45 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 92. Consider how “terrorism” is now defined: 
A person engages in domestic terrorism if they do an act “dangerous to human 
life” that is a violation of the criminal laws of a state or the United States, if the 
act appears to be intended to: (i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or 
kidnapping. 
ACLU, How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism” (Dec. 6, 2002), 
http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/14444leg20021206.html (citing USA PATRIOT 
Act, supra note 78, § 802).  If establishing (i)–(iii) is a matter of determining intentions, 
then the current debate over the legitimacy of torture may be seen in a new light.  
Alas, one way to determine the intentional status of a suspect is to torture him. 
 93. The Department of Justice also used the material support provisions of the 
Patriot Act to prosecute Muslim student Sami al-Hussayen for engaging in 
First Amendment activities.  Section 805 of the Patriot Act made it a crime to 
provide material support in the form of “expert advice and assistance” to a 
designated foreign terrorist organization.  Al-Hussayen, a 34-year old doctoral 
candidate at the University of Idaho and a computer expert, was charged with 
providing “expert advice and assistance” because, among other things, he 
volunteered as a Webmaster for the Islamic Assembly of North America—an 
organization the government had not put on its list of foreign terrorist 




news agencies reported that the FBI had overstepped its authority and 
tried to cover it up.  The audit by the Justice Department also found that 
the FBI had hatched an agreement with telephone companies allowing the 
agency to ask for information on more than 3,000 phone numbers—often 
without a subpoena, without an emergency or even without an investigative case.  
In 2006, the FBI then issued blanket letters authorizing many of the requests 
retroactively, according to agency officials and congressional aides briefed on 
the effort.94 
“Just trust us” sentiments might have more force if robust accountability 
provisions accompanied them.  But FISA courts meet in secret, their findings 
are almost never published, and only government officials appear before 
the court.95  Bush’s program authorizing the NSA to monitor international 
phone calls of U.S. citizens was secret—even more alarming to some, 
information about the program was withheld for a year by a “free press.”96  
One can only wonder what other secret programs are currently in place.97  
organizations.  The government charged that this volunteer activity constituted 
expert advice and assistance. 
    Al-Hussayen’s web pages provided many links, including links to “fatwas” 
that advocated criminal activity and suicide operations, but that were not 
written by al-Hussayen.  Essentially, he was reporting what others said—something 
journalists do every day.  Al-Hussayen’s lawyer also established that Reuven 
Paz, a prosecution witness, admitted that he had posted much of the same 
information on his own website and that the BBC did as well.  The Justice 
Department did not stop this abuse of the Patriot Act, and detained al-
Hussayen for one and one-half years on minor immigration charges.  It was a 
jury that stopped this abuse by finding al-Hussayen not guilty of all terrorism 
charges leveled against him.  He was later deported on immigration charges. 
Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Letter to Senator Feinstein Addressing the Abuses of the 
Patriot Act by the Government (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17 
563leg20050404.html (citation omitted). 
 94. Dan Eggen & John Solomen, FBI Audit Prompts Calls for Reform; Some 
Lawmakers Suggest Limits on Patriot Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007, at A1. 
 95. The eagerness of many in law enforcement to dispense with the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment was revealed in August 2002 by the secret court that 
oversees domestic intelligence spying (the “FISA Court”).  Making public one 
of its opinions for the first time in history, the court revealed that it had 
rejected an attempt by the Bush Administration to allow criminal prosecutors 
to use intelligence warrants to evade the Fourth Amendment entirely.  The 
court also noted that agents applying for warrants had regularly filed false and 
misleading information.  That opinion is now on appeal. 
ACLU, Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT Act (Apr. 3, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/ 
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12263&c=206. 
 96. See Eggen & Solomen, supra note 94.  One theory about why President Bush 
would sidestep FISA, which has never rejected a warrant application, is that the 
information used as the basis of the search was obtained by U.S. operatives torturing 
prisoners outside the United States. 
 97. “Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is 
safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity.”  Lord Acton, letter 74, 
(Jan. 23, 1861), in LORD ACTON AND HIS CIRCLE 165, 166 (Abbot Gasquet ed., 
Longmans, Green & Co. 1906). 
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Moreover, a generally recognized principle embedded in our Constitution is 
due process—individual rights are not to be violated or overridden without 
due process of law.98  Secret courts and search programs that include no 
accountability provisions may violate due process.99 
E.  The Nothing to Hide Argument100 
A counterpart to the “just trust us” argument is the nothing to hide 
argument.  According to this argument, we are to balance the disvalue of 
privacy intrusions related to data mining and the like with the security 
interests of detecting and preventing terrorist attacks.  I suppose we could 
weaken this further by merely referencing security interests, which would 
include but not be limited to terrorist attacks.  A formal version of the 
argument might go something like this: 
P1. When two fundamental interests conflict, we should adopt a  
 balancing strategy, determine which interest is more compelling,  
 and then sacrifice the lesser interest for the greater interest.  If it  
 is generally true that one sort of interest is more fundamental than  
 another, we are warranted in adopting specific policies that seek  
 to trade the lesser interest for the greater interest. 
P2. In the conflict between privacy and security, it is almost always  
 the case that security interests outweigh privacy interests.  The  privacy 
intrusions related to data mining or NSA surveillance are not as 
 weighty as our security interests in stopping terrorism, et cetera— 
 these sorts of privacy intrusions are more of a nuisance than a  
 harm. 
C3. So it follows that we should sacrifice privacy in these cases and  
 perhaps adopt policies that allow privacy intrusions for security  
 reasons. 
One could easily attack premise 2—there are numerous harms 
associated with allowing surveillance that are conveniently minimized or 
forgotten by the “nothing to hide” crowd.  The chilling effects on behavior, 
data aggregation, exclusion, and secondary use each ratchet up the harms 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 99. Secret courts and search programs may also violate “equal protection” 
guarantees when specific groups are targeted. 
 100. For a more rigorous analysis of this argument see Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got 
Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 
(2007). 




caused by data monitoring and government surveillance.  Daniel J. Solove 
notes, “[P]rivacy is threatened not by singular egregious acts, but by a 
slow series of relatively minor acts which gradually begin to add up.”101  
Solove also points out, as I have already highlighted, that giving 
governments too much power undermines the mission of providing for 
security—the government itself becomes the threat to security.102  John 
Locke put the point nicely: “This is to think that men are so foolish that 
they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-Cats 
or foxes, but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.”103  
It is also important to note the risk of mischief associated with criminals 
and terrorists compared to the kinds of mischief perpetrated by 
governments—even our government.  In cases where there is a lack of 
accountability provisions and independent oversight, governments may 
pose the greater security risk. 
Consider a slight variation of the “nothing to hide” argument related to 
what I have called physical privacy.  Suppose there was a way to complete 
body cavity searches without harming the target or being more than a 
mere nuisance.  Perhaps we search the target after he has passed out drunk.  
Would anyone find it plausible to maintain a “nothing to hide” view in 
this case?  I think not.  And the reason might be that we are more confident 
in upholding these rights and the policies that protect these rights than 
we are of almost any cost-benefit analysis related to security.  Whether 
rights are viewed as strategic rules that guide us to the best 
consequences, as Mill would argue, or understood as deontic-based constraints 
on consequentialist sorts of reasoning, we are more confident in them 
than in almost any “social good” calculation.104  I am not saying that rights 
are absolute; they are just presumptively weighty.  This line of argument 
is an attack on the first premise of the “nothing to hide” position offered 
above.  In essence, it is the view that rights are resistant to cost-benefit or 
consequentialist sorts of arguments.  Here we are rejecting the view that 
privacy interests are the sorts of things that can be traded for security. 
Another worry for the “nothing to hide” argument has to do with justice 
and the distribution of harms.  Jeremy Waldron writes: 
If security-gains for most people are being balanced against liberty-losses for a 
few, then we need to pay attention to the few/most dimension of the balance, 
not just the liberty/security dimension. 
 101. Id. at 769. 
 102. Id. at 766–67; see also supra notes 84–99 and accompanying text. 
 103. LOCKE, supra note 46, at 53. 
 104. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 41–63 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1979) (1861); J.J.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344, 
344–45 (1956).  See generally DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 
(1965) (comparing various utilitarian theories). 
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 . . . . 
 . . . We are not balancing the rights of the innocent against the rights of the 
guilty.  We are balancing the interests in life or liberty of the one innocent man 
against the security interests of those of the rest of us . . . that will be served if 
[criminals] are convicted by the procedures that lead to the wrongful conviction 
of the innocent.105 
The distribution aspect is highlighted when surveillance policies pick 
targets based on appearance, ethnicity, or religion.  If the burden of 
surveillance policy and the corresponding harms fall on one portion of 
society, we may have a problem of justice. 
Waldron also notes that balancers who seek to trade privacy for 
security typically have little evidence of the overall effect of some 
surveillance policy, and whether there might be some other policy that 
better protects both privacy and security.106  Consider just for example, almost 
any predominately developed “isolationist” country—perhaps Switzerland.  
Although admittedly I have not researched this claim, my guess is that 
these sorts of countries do not have much terrorist activity and likely do 
not have higher crime rates than the United States.  The point here is that 
one way to obtain more security would be to change our selectively 
interventionist policies.  In this way security and privacy could be protected. 
F.  The “Security Trumps” View 
According to what might be called the “security trumps” view,107 
whenever privacy and security conflict, security wins—that is, security 
 105. Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 
191, 203–04 (2003). 
 106. Id. at 208–09. 
 107. Balancing arguments that seek to justify trading privacy for security are 
typically based on the assumption that privacy and security are measurable values that 
can be compared and traded like diamonds for gold.  This view does not need to hold 
that we can trade six units of privacy for ten units of security.  All we need to be able to 
do is justifiably claim that there is some amount of privacy that we would be willing to 
trade for some other amount of security. 
But it is not at all clear how these trade-offs should work or how these items should be 
measured.  For example, we may agree that there is no amount of ice cream that we 
would trade for our arms and legs.  This case is based on Laurence H. Tribe, Policy 
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 90 (1972).  See also James 
Griffin, Are there Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 44 (1977).  Ice cream 
may be tasty, but it is not on the same scale as arms and legs.  Or suppose we were faced 
with the choice of living normally for a year and then dying or having a brain operation 
and living in a vegetative state for thirty years.  See Griffin, supra, at 47.  It is not at all 
clear that any amount of “vegetative” existence is worth one year of normal living.  




is more fundamental and valuable than privacy.  First, without arguments, it 
is not clear why a “security trumps” view should be adopted over a “privacy 
trumps” view.  Privacy or perhaps self-ownership seems at least as 
fundamental or intuitively weighty as security. 
Foreshadowing things to come, it is not at all clear—at least in some 
cases—that privacy does not enhance security and vice versa.  Suppose 
that rights afforded their holders specific sorts of powers.  For example, 
Fred’s privacy rights generate in him a god-like power to completely 
control access to his body and to information about him.  If we had such 
powers, we would also have increased security.  Furthermore, if we had 
complete security in our bodies and property, including informational 
security, we would have secured privacy as well.  The tension between 
privacy and security arises because these values cannot be protected by 
individuals acting alone.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that as 
these services are contracted out to other agents, like governments, we 
grant these parties power over us—power that may undermine security 
and privacy. 
Continuing with the “security trumps” argument, it would seem odd to 
maintain that any increase in security should be preferred to any increase 
in privacy or any decrease in privacy is to be preferred to any decrease in 
security.  Such a view would sanction massive violations of privacy for 
mere incremental and perhaps momentary gains in security.  Also, given 
that others will provide security and power is likely a necessary part of 
providing security, we have strong prudential reasons to reject the 
“security trumps” view.  If those who provide security were saints, then 
perhaps there would be little to worry about.  The cases already presented 
are sufficient to show that we are not dealing with saints. 
G.  Turning Security Arguments on Their Heads 
It is false to claim that in every case more privacy means less security 
or that more security entails less privacy.  Security arguments actually 
James Griffin is not so sure arguing that if dessert consumption was not subject to 
diminishing marginal utility (roughly meaning the more you have of something the less 
valuable it is), was worth something, and we could contemplate the large numbers 
involved, there may be a trade-off point.  Id. at 44.  In addition, living a long life in a 
vegetative state may have no value so the second case has no force—there are no values 
to trade-off in this case. 
I think that it is clear that most of us would trade privacy for a certain level of 
monetary compensation.  Suppose someone offered you a cool million dollars to watch 
you for a day.  Nevertheless, coming up with an ordinal, cardinal, or mere better than/less 
than ranking of some amount of privacy compared to some amount of security would be 
difficult, especially when such calculations are related to rules or legislation.  For a 
discussion of incommensurability, see generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). 
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cut the other direction in some cases. For example, it is only through 
enhanced privacy protections that we can obtain appropriate levels of 
security against industrial espionage, unwarranted invasions into private 
domains, and information warfare or terrorism. 
An example of how privacy protections enhance security comes from 
the debate over encryption standards for electronic communications and 
computer networks.  Although the NSA’s position is that the widespread 
use of encryption software will allow criminals a sanctuary to exchange 
information necessary for the completion of illegal activities, consider 
how easily this security argument can be turned on its head.  National 
security for government agencies, companies, and individuals actually 
requires strong encryption.  Spies have admitted to “tapping in” and 
collecting valuable information on U.S. companies—information that 
was then used to gain a competitive advantage.108  A report from the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies Task Force on Information 
Warfare and Security notes, “Cyber terrorists could potentially overload 
telephone lines; disrupt air traffic control . . . scramble the software used 
by major financial institutions, hospitals, and other emergency services; . . . 
or sabotage the New York Stock Exchange.”109  Related to information 
war, it would seem that national security requires strong encryption, 
multilevel firewalls, and automated detection of attacks. 
H.  Balancing Privacy, Security, and Accountability 
Suppose that there was good evidence that an attack was about to 
happen in a private domain.  In this case we may be more confident that 
security interests outweigh privacy interests and allow the intrusion.  To 
avoid the travesties already mentioned, we need a set of policies or rules 
that adequately protect privacy and security.110 
 108. JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 51 (1997). 
 109. Christopher Jones, Averting an Electronic Waterloo, WIRED, Dec. 16, 1998, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1998/12/16875; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right 
of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 207–08 (2002). 
 110. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), the court ruled that the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to physical things 
like houses, notebooks, and receipts, but not to electronic communications.  Thirty-nine 
years later the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), overturned 
the Olmstead decision, holding that privacy interests may be found in personal 
communications as well as “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”  Id. at 353 (quoting 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV).  Olmstead and Katz represent the very issue we are considering—
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With probable cause, a warrant issued from a judge, and “sunlight” 
provisions opening up the warrant and the procedure to public scrutiny, 
we can be confident that security concerns may be addressed with minimal 
impact on individual privacy.  The requirement of probable cause puts the 
burden of proof in the appropriate place—invasions of private domains 
must be justified.  The official seeking the warrant would highlight the security 
risks involved along with the privacy interests at stake.  Judicial oversight 
inserts an outside element into the process, providing a check on the 
enthusiasm of law enforcement officials.  In any event, the question of 
when security should override privacy would not be left to the subjective 
judgment of one individual or a small group of individuals with 
similar interests.  Finally, sunlight provisions provide public oversight of 
the entire process, including the reasons for the warrant and the judicial 
ruling.  In this way, public accountability is ensured at each step.  Consider 






 Magnitude of Invasion 
Duration, Extent, Means 
 
Slight  Profound 






















 Context  
Little Expectation   Reasonable Expectation 
The subject will be monitored 
in “public”—perhaps as they 
walk down the street. 
 The subject will be 
monitored at their primary 
residence. 
 
 Consent  
Consented to  Surveillance  Evaded Surveillance 
The subject consents to the 
surveillance. 
 The subject actively avoids 
surveillance. 
 
 Public Security  
Substantial Security Threat  Little Security Threat 
Credible evidence that lives 
are at stake.  
 The pacifist alliance plans to 
have a bake sale to raise 
funds.842 
when do security interests justify invasions of private domains.  See also Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967). 
 111. Adapted from the analysis offered by Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy 
Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 
N.C. L. REV. 989, 1063–67, 1087–88 (1995). 
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First, if the subject has consented to the surveillance, then the magnitude, 
context, and security dimensions become irrelevant—such monitoring 
would be justified.  Short of consent, if the magnitude is slight, the context 
is clearly “public,” and the security threat high, the burden of proof for 
overriding privacy would be low.  Sliding to the other extreme, if the 
magnitude of the invasion is profound, the context clearly “private,” and 
the security threat low, then the burden for overriding privacy would be 
high.  Finally, if there is a substantial security threat backed by clear and 
credible evidence, then independent of the magnitude, context, or consent, 
the burden for overriding privacy would be low.  For example, if a 
police officer has good evidence that a murder will take place tomorrow 
afternoon at a suspect’s home, then a warrant would be justified. 
In addition, there will be justifiable exceptions to the rule of requiring 
probable cause and warrants.  There may be instances when law enforcement 
officials need to act quickly and do not have the time to secure a warrant 
or provide an argument for probable cause—suppose a police officer 
hears a scuffle and someone shouts for help.  Provided that law enforcement 
officers act in “good faith” and can articulate reasonable grounds for entering 
private domains after the fact, they should be given some leeway in 
these cases.  Perhaps internal and civilian oversight committees could 
review such cases to determine if appropriate action was pursued.  Thus 
even in “emergency” situations where privacy is traded for security without 
a warrant or judicial oversight, we may insist on sunlight provisions and 
accountability. 
Security concerns related to mass transportation or large public 
gatherings may also justify an exception to the probable cause rule—
individuals may be searched without evidence that they will commit a 
crime in these cases.  Nevertheless there are at least two important controls 
that should be noted.  First, individuals in many instances consent to these 
sorts of minimal intrusions.  If you do not want to have your bag searched, 
then stay home and watch the ballgame on television.  Note that the more 
voluntary the activity, the more robust the consent.  Second, in cases where 
the activity is less voluntary—flying on an airplane for example—we 
insist on stronger justifications for more intrusive searches.  Moreover, 
judicial and civilian oversight are still appropriate mechanisms for 
establishing the correct balance between privacy and security in these 
cases.  Few would sanction body cavity searches at airports for the minimal 
gains in security that could be obtained. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
While there is still much work to be done, I think that important steps 
have been taken toward informational privacy rights.  Privacy—defined 
as a control right over access to locations and information—is necessary 
for human well-being.  Individuals who use and possess their own personal 
information do not necessarily worsen others.  Moreover, those who capture, 
store, and transfer personal information create risks that may worsen 
information targets.  Finally, a presumptive claim to use and control one’s 
own personal information coupled with property rights, body rights, and 
a general right to make contracts may serve to protect informational 
privacy. 
I have also argued that balancing tests that purport to justify invasions 
of privacy in the name of security often go awry.  “Just trust us,” “nothing 
to hide,” and “security trumps” arguments have each been presented and 
rejected.  It has also been argued that in trading privacy for security we 
should insist on establishing probable cause, judicial oversight, and 
accountability.  Probable cause, in the typical case, sets the standard for 
when security interests override privacy rights.  Judicial oversight, sensitive 
to case-specific facts like the context and magnitude of the proposed 
intrusion, introduce an “objective” agent into the process.  Sunlight provisions 
allow for a public discussion of the merits of specific searches and 
seizures.  All of this promotes accountability in that the reasons for a search 
and the actions of government officials are open to public scrutiny.  A 
further benefit is that such policies engender trust and confidence in 
public officials. 
A transparent society is not inevitable.  Privacy at the personal level 
can be secured through custom and social pressure.  Privacy related to 
big media, corporations, and the state can be guaranteed by law and 
grounded in customs and social practices.  On the other hand, transparency 
is an important part of good government in the sense that those in power 
can be held accountable for their actions.  Justice William O. Douglas, 
writing for the dissent in Osborn v. United States, noted: 
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are being 
recorded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his most 
secret thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government; when the 
most confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying 
ears.  When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone.  If a 
man’s privacy can be invaded at will, who can say he is free?  If his every word 
is taken down and evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can say 
he enjoys freedom of speech?  If his every association is known and recorded, if 
the conversations with his associates are purloined, who can say he enjoys 
freedom of association?  When such conditions obtain, our citizens will be 
afraid to utter any but the safest and most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate 
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with any but the most acceptable people.  Freedom as the Constitution envisages it 
will have vanished.112 
Douglas offers a sobering and frightening prediction of what will 
ensue if privacy is not tirelessly and vigorously defended.  For the sake 
of freedom, autonomy, and human well-being, we should resist becoming a 
































 112. 385 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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